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Abstract
Handling faults is a growing concern in HPC; higher error rates, larger
detection intervals, and silent faults are expected in the future. It is pro-
jected that, in exascale systems, errors will occur several times a day, in-
creasing the occurrence of problems that will range from process crashes to
corrupted results because of undetected errors. In this article, we propose
SEDAR, a methodology that improves system reliability against transient
faults, when running parallel message-passing applications. The proposed
solution, based on process replication for detection, combined with differ-
ent levels of checkpointing (i.e. system-level or user-level checkpoints) for
automatic recovery, has the goal of helping users of scientific applications
to achieve reliable executions with correct results. Detection is achieved
by internally replicating each process of the application in threads and
comparing the contents of messages between threads before sending to
another process; additionally, the final results are validated. This strategy
allows relaunching execution from the beginning upon detection, without
unnecessarily waiting to an incorrect conclusion. To accomplish recovery,
system-level checkpoints are used, but because there is no guarantee that
a particular checkpoint does not contain silent corruption, multiple check-
points need to be stored, and a mechanism is implemented for successively
retry recovery from a previous one if the same error is detected again.
The last option is to use a single, custom user-level checkpoint, which can
be verified to ensure its validity as a safe recovery point. Consequently,
SEDAR is structured in three levels: (1) only detection and safe-stop with
notification; (2) recovery based on a chain of system-level checkpoints; and
(3) recovery based on a single valid user-level checkpoint. Each of these
variants supplies a particular coverage but has inherent limitations and
implementation costs; the possibility of choosing between them provides
flexibility to adapt the cost-benefit relation to the needs of a particular
system. This work presents a description of the methodology, its behav-
ior in the presence of faults and the temporal costs of employing each
option. A model is presented, considering various cases of faults over a
test application and their predictable effects, and experimental validation
is made across a real implementation. Considering the introduced over-
head, the model also states the conditions under which it is worth starting
protection and storing several checkpoints for recovery, instead of simply
detecting, stopping and relaunching. As a result, we show its efficacy and
viability to tolerate transient faults in target HPC environments.
Keywords: soft error detection, automatic recovery, system-level checkpoint,
user-level checkpoint
1 Introduction
In the area of High-Performance Computing (HPC), parallel systems continue
increasing the number of components to improve their performance and, as a
consequence, ensuring their reliability has become a critical issue. Nowadays,
fault rates involve just a few hours on modern platforms [1] but it is forecasted
that large parallel applications will have to manage fault rates of barely some
minutes in exascale supercomputers [2]. In that sense, these applications require
some help in order to progress efficiently.
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Currently, there are different types of transient errors affecting parallel pro-
grams; Silent Data Corruption (SDC) is the most dangerous of them as several
recent reports have stated [3]. When SDC occurs, the application seems to run
correctly but, at the end, the results are wrong. Science is one of the areas
strongly affected by SDC, since it historically has relied on large-scale simula-
tions. Therefore, the treatment of silent errors is one of the greatest challenges
in current and future resilience.
Without a fault tolerance mechanism, an application could crash due to a
failure affecting just one task. Worse, the program could output invalid results
that, in the best-case scenario, will be detected upon the execution conclu-
sion. In addition, a single SDC can cause deep effects, propagating across all
processes that communicate in a message-passing application [4]. One way to
tolerate transient faults is to rely on hardware redundancy (registers and pro-
cessor arithmetical logic units); nevertheless, this approach is highly expensive
and difficult to implement [5]. Given the high cost of re-running the application
from the start if a fault is detected, specific software strategies are required in
order to reach a suitable cost-benefit trade-off.
Performing redundant software execution is a common way to provide re-
silience. Following the state machine replication approach, a process is dupli-
cated and both copies proceed with the same execution sequence. As a result,
for deterministic applications, they produce the same output for the same in-
put [6]. In the HPC context, using multicore architectures represents a viable
solution for detecting SDCs since its natural redundancy [1].
Fail-stop failures cause a process to crash. A common, well-studied technique
to reduce their impact consist in Checkpoint-based rollback recovery (C/R) [7].
When coordinated checkpointing is used, the entire state of an application is
saved in a periodic manner. So, if a failure takes place, all the processes can
restart from their recent checkpoints. Unfortunately, C/R is time-consuming
and the overhead increases as the number of cores grows. Nonetheless, its major
weakness consists in not guaranteeing a safe recovery, since a stored checkpoint
could contain undetected errors. This situation gets aggravated in the case of
strongly coupled computation, since an error in one node could propagate to
the others in microseconds [8].
Considering these circumstances of non-reliable results and their expensive
verification, this paper presents SEDAR, which is a methodology designed to
provide transient fault tolerance for scientific message-passing parallel applica-
tions that execute in multicore clusters. SEDAR seeks to help programmers
and users of parallel scientific applications (specially those that are critical)
to accomplish reliability in their executions. Following this methodology, each
process of the parallel application gets replicated and both copies executes on
different cores of the same socket, taking advantage of the multicore’s hardware
redundancy. Three different ways are provided by SEDAR so it can achieve
silent error coverage: (1) only detection with a notification (formerly called
SMCV); (2) recovery based on multiple system-level checkpoints; and (3) recov-
ery utilizing a single safe application-level checkpoint. Each of these alternatives
has particular features and provides a different cost-performance trade-off.
A preliminary, more conceptual version of this work is available in [9]. This
article fully describes and validates the methodology, extending the insights
already offered in the previous approach , with the following new contributions:
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• The introduction of an analytical model that shows the efficacy of the
detection strategy and the validity of the recovery mechanism based on
multiple, system-level coordinated checkpoints.
• The description of a case study, built on a well-known test application, in
order to show SEDAR operation. This includes the design of a complete,
carefully controlled workfault that allow us to empirically validate the
recovery strategy.
• An implementation of the multiple-checkpoints-based recovery algorithm,
building system-level checkpoints with DMTCP library, and the details of
the experimental work made to verify its operation.
• An evaluation of the temporal costs of each alternative strategy, which
includes the measurement and estimation of execution parameters.
• A discussion about the convenience of saving multiple checkpoints for
recovery over just having the detection mechanism alone, in a try of pro-
viding guidelines about when it is beneficial to employ each strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews some
basic concepts and related work. Section 3 describes the proposed methodol-
ogy from a functional point of view, separating it in the three aforementioned
strategies. Section 4 presents the evaluation of the recovery strategy, in addition
to a discussion about the convenience of utilization and adaptation, consider-
ing the temporal behavior of the possible strategies. Finally, in Section 5, the
conclusions and future lines of work are detailed.
2 Background and Related Work
Transient faults can be classified according to their consequences on the program
execution [10]. A Latent Error (LE) is a non-harmful fault since it does not affect
the final results. This kind of error alters data that are not used anymore. On
the contrary, when a Detected Unrecoverable Error (DUE) occurs, a program
ends suddenly; the system software can be aware of DUEs but cannot recover
from them. In the case of a Time Out Error (TOE), the application does not
finish within a stipulated time range. Finally, as mentioned before, when SDC
takes part, the application seems to execute correctly ; however, invalid results
are produced. Particularly, in message-passing parallel programs, SDC can be
sub-classified into two different types of errors according to [11]: (1) Transmitted
Data Corruption (TDC) alters data to be sent by a process, which will propagate
to the rest if it is not detected; (2) Final Status Corruption (FSC) has effect on
non-communicated data, spreading the error in local manner and invalidating
the final results.
Nowadays, there is no silver bullet to manage frequent SDC. Some avail-
able algorithmic solutions only apply to specific kernels [12]. On the contrary,
compiler or runtime software-based detection proposals are more general since
they can be employed to any code, but at the cost of a significant increase in
complexity. In addition, containment strategies seek to reduce the fault conse-
quences, either stopping its propagation to the other nodes or to the data stored
4
in checkpoints that are needed to recover [7]. In [13], the authors increase avail-
ability and offer a trade-off between the number and the quality of components
through redundancy in HPC systems. In the same way, [14] showed that repli-
cation results more efficient than C/R under circumstances of high error rate
and overhead of the last.
Traditionally, SDC detection is achieved through execution replication com-
bined with partial or total result comparison during the execution. Software-
redundancy solutions remove the need for expensive hardware performing repli-
cation at the level of threads [15], processes [5] or machine status. On the
other hand, other proposals require fewer resources but at the cost of reducing
its accuracy. One of them is approximate replication, which implements upper
and lower limits for computation results [7]. MR-MPI [13] employs a trans-
parent redundancy approach for HPC. It proposes partial process replication
and can be used together with C/R in non-replicated processes [16]. rMPI [14]
takes on fail-stop failures by means of redundant execution of MPI applications.
Using this protocol, the program fails only if two corresponding replicas fail
because each node is duplicated. The probability of simultaneous failure of a
node and its replica decreases when the number of nodes increases, so redun-
dancy scales. However, this benefit requires duplicating the number of resources
and quadrupling the number of messages. Faults in shared-memory systems are
explored in [6], where a scheme based on multi-threaded processes is proposed,
including non-determinism management due to memory accesses. A protocol
for hybrid task-parallel MPI programs is described in [1], which carries out re-
covery based on uncoordinated checkpoints and message logging. Only the task
that presented the error is restarted and all the MPI calls are handled inside it.
RedMPI [4] is an MPI library that exploits rMPI’s per-process replication to de-
tect and correct SDC, comparing the messages sent by replicated issuers at the
receiver side. It avoids sending all messages and comparing their entire contents
through a hashing-based optimization. In addition, it does not require source
code modification and guarantees determinism among replicated processes. As
it offers protection even when high failure rates occur, RedMPI is a potential
alternative to be used on large-scale systems. It is shown that even a single
transient error can produce deep effects on the program, causing a corruption
pattern that cascades towards all other processes through MPI messages. In
a similar way to SEDAR, RedMPI also enables replicas mapping on the same
physical node as the native processes, or in neighbors with lower network la-
tency. Like our proposal, it monitors communications, as a strategy to attempt
providing the correct output. Detection is delayed upon transmission, but, as
opposed to SEDAR, validation is carried out on the receiver side. This produces
an additional overhead, and latency and network congestion that is not present
in our solution. Fault tolerant protocols for other parallel programming models,
such as PGAS [17] have been also explored. The combination of checkpointing
the output of tasks and replicating for application-specific detection is explored
in [2] for a linear workflow context, in the presence of both fail-stop and silent
faults.
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3 Description of the Methodology
The following subsections are dedicated to the description of the basics of the
different proposed options to accomplish transient fault tolerance. In addition,
an evaluation of the temporal costs of implementing each specific feature is also
included. In that sense, a simple model has been developed, which considers the
factors that have influence over the total execution time, both in the absence of
faults as when a single silent error occurs during the execution.
To evaluate the different strategies, a baseline is used, which consists of a
manual method for ensuring reliable results. This method involves launching
two simultaneous instances of the application, and comparing the final results of
both executions in a non-automatic manner. In this way, the same computing
resources that in our proposal are consumed are assigned to each individual
instance (i.e., half of the total cores of the system). In the absence of faults, the
final results coincide; however, if a transient fault occurs, a third re-execution
and a new comparison are required to pick the outputs of the runs that form a
majority by means of a voting mechanism.
The time elapsed by the manual method in the absence of faults is given
by Equation 1 (fault absence, TFA). On the other hand, Equation 2 is the
time when a fault occurs (fault presence, TFP ), taking into account that there
exists a restart time (Trest) and a new comparison for voting, besides to the
re-execution time. In Table 1, the parameters involved in the equations and
their meanings are summarized.
TFA = Tprog + Tcomp (1)
TFP = 2(Tprog + Tcomp) + Trest (2)
3.1 Error detection with notification
In order to accomplish detection when running deterministic parallel applica-
tions, which is the first SEDAR feature, the messages between processes are
validated before being sent. Thus, the error that affects any process can be
isolated, preventing it from propagating to the others.
The detection strategy consists of duplicating each application process in
a thread, which requires a synchronization mechanism between both replicas.
Every time communication is to be performed, the leading thread stops running
and then waits for its replica to reach the same point. Once there, the detection
mechanism compares the entire contents of the messages computed by both
redundant threads and, if there is a coincidence, only one of them sends the
message. Such a mechanism does not require additional network bandwidth.
When the receiver process reaches the receive operation, it gets the message
and in turn waits for its replica to synchronize. Next, it makes a copy of the
received contents before resuming execution. Additionally, because failure may
have locally propagated until the end of the execution, a comparison of the final
results of the application is performed, thus allowing to detect such failures.
This detection strategy is capable of detecting failures that cause SDC (both
variants). As regards TOE, they can be detected under the assumption that
the execution time of two redundant threads is similar in an homogeneous,
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Parameter Meaning
Tprog The execution time of two instances of the
original application in parallel.
Tcomp Time of manual comparison of results. An au-
tomatic comparison may take shorter. In sim-
plified model it is considered the same; may
include calculating a hash.
Trest Time of manually restarting the application.
An automatic restart may take shorter. In
simplified model it is considered the same.
fd The fraction of overhead due to detection
mechanism. It application dependent and can
be experimentally determined. 0 < fd <1.
X Instant of fault detection, expressed as a frac-
tion of the application progress. Random.
0 < X <1.
n Number of checkpoints made during the whole
execution, given a checkpoint interval.
tcs Time involved in storing a system checkpoint.
ti Checkpoint interval. It can be adjusted to
minimize overhead.
k A number of additional checkpoints that the
application needs to rollback in order to find
a non-corrupted one. It depends on the appli-
cation and the detection latency.
tca The time involved in storing an application
checkpoint. It should be shorter than tcs.
TcompA The time for validating an application check-
point; it may include calculating a hash.
Table 1: Name and meaning of the parameters involved in temporal character-
ization of each alternative strategy
dedicated system [18]. Hence, if an appreciable delay is noticed between the
two replicas, it is considered that a silent error has caused the separation of
their flows. As a single time-out interval is not optimal, it should be configured
taking into account the application needs: if it is too long, the detection latency
enlarges, but being too short may cause false positive detection. Anyway, a
TOE is definitely detected if a process enters an infinite loop.
A scheme of the proposed detection strategy is shown in Figure 1. Each
replica runs in a core that shares a cache level with the core in which the
original process executes; thus, the comparisons are solved without absent (or
reduces) access to main memory, taking advantage of the memory hierarchy. It
should be clear that the proposed detection mechanism is based on launching
a single instance of the application, with each process internally replicated in a
thread. This is different from the baseline, in which two independent instances
of the application are launched in parallel; nevertheless, both cases make the
same use of half of the available cores from the application performance point
of view.
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[h]
(a) Normal operation in absence of faults
(b) Operation when detecting a fault
Figure 1: Outline of the operation of the detection mechanism
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As this methodology is based on process-replication, it is a priori capable
of performing only detection (triple redundancy needs to be used to achieve
correction). The ways to accomplish recovery without the need of triplicating are
described in the two next subsections. It is important to note that SEDAR does
not introduce any extra cost because of including fault tolerance mechanisms,
given that it makes use of the system’s available resources.
The set of all the steps involved in the detection, such as the replication
of processes, synchronization between redundant threads, comparison before
sending, copy of the messages upon reception and final verification of the results
is the cause of the overhead introduced in the overall execution time.
A trade-off has also to be reached in relation to the validation interval. The
overhead involved in detection can be minimized if results are compared only at
the end, but because the detection latency increases, a lot of computation could
be useless. On the other hand, if the frequency of partial results validation is
high, the introduced overhead enlarges but the fault can be quickly detected,
and hence more computation is profitable. There is evidence that, depending on
the computation-to-communication ratio of the particular application, as well
as on the size of the workload, the overhead can differ in a significant manner
[18].
In the absence of a recovery strategy, the occurrence of an SDC or a TOE
causes the only-detection strategy to notify the user and lead the system to
a safe stop, preventing it from delivering defective results. As validating the
messages has the effect of limiting the detection latency, the implementation of
such a strategy permits to re-launch the execution as soon as the error is de-
tected, thus avoiding the needless and expensive wait for the termination with
corrupted results. The execution time of the detection strategy in the absence
of faults is given by Equation 3. The factor fd covers the overhead of the detec-
tion mechanism, thus affecting negatively the execution time. If a fault occurs,
the execution time is accounted in Equation 4. The first term comprises the
time executed until the detection instant and the whole re-execution. When the
fault is detected, a restart is required, followed by the final comparison in the
re-execution.
TFA = Tprog(1 + fd) + Tcomp (3)
TFP = Tprog(1 + fd)(X + 1) + Trest + Tcomp (4)
A remarkable fact is that the proposed detection strategy is equally effective
when multiple errors occur along the execution. The first difference, caused by
an error, that is observable in the contents of a message or in the final results
will produce the system to safely stop. The vulnerability of this mechanism is
reduced to only two extremely unlikely cases, which are detailed in [19]. Conse-
quently, despite we limit the analysis of the temporal behavior the cases of fault
absence or single error occurrence, the detection strategy can handle multiple
non-related errors. As regards the implementation, the procedure that needs to
be made for adding the detection functionality to the parallel application (that
could be automated) is detailed in [18].
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3.2 Recovery based on multiple system-level checkpoints
The next step in the search for transient fault tolerance consists in adding a
recovery mechanism. In SEDAR, it is proposed to store a chain of distributed
coordinated checkpoints, built with a system-level checkpointing library.
It is not possible to ensure that any particular checkpoint holds a safe state
for recovery because a silent error can spoil the internal state of one of the
replicas that is to be checkpointed. Therefore, the feasibility of restarting from
the last stored checkpoint, or if an older one is required has to be determined.
Thus, multiple checkpoints have to be saved in order to guarantee recovery [8].
As the transient faults are fleeting, it is important to note that the restart can
be attempted from the same node that experiments corruption. There are two
are possible cases:
1. The transient fault occurs and is detected inside the boundaries of a check-
point interval. In this situation, the last checkpoint can be used to resume
the execution. As a particular case, if the detection occurs previously to
the first checkpoint, the application must be relaunched from the begin-
ning.
2. The detection latency transposes the limits of the checkpoint interval.
This circumstance arises when the fault occurs before storing a check-
point but the detection takes place after that. This situation makes the
last checkpoint invalid, so the corresponding restart causes the same er-
ror to manifest. Consequently, the previous checkpoint must be used to
attempt to restart. Even, generalizing, the fault can cross any number of
checkpoints, depending on the detection latency, and several tries may be
done to make rollback recovery possible.
Controlled fault injections experiments are required to verify the operation
of the recovery strategy when the two aforementioned cases occur. The data
corruption becomes evident as an observable difference between the memory
state of the replicas; hence, to simulate a bit-flip in a processor register, the
value of a variable is changed in only one of the replicated threads, in a single
iteration of the computation. Such an injection is made from inside the code
of the application. The details of the injection method are described in section
4.2.
The recovery strategy is outlined in Figure 2, while Algorithm 1 describes
the pseudo-code of the proposed method. For the sake of clarity, the injection
mechanism is not included in the algorithm.
The usability of this method can be increased by automating it. This can be
accomplished if an outsider process is allowed to read the extern counter and,
based on its value, find the correct restart script to try recovery; besides that,
the checkpoint that has caused the wrong restart has to be erased (and stored
again in re-execution). In turn, the code of fault injection is executed only once,
and the target application modifies the value of extern counter every time a
fault is detected.
In the absence of faults, the execution time of this mechanism is given by
Equation 5. Compared with only-detection case, the extra term accounts for
the time involved in saving n system-level checkpoints. When a fault occurs,
the execution time is the one of Equation 6. The parameter k is the number of
10
(a) Detection latency confined within the checkpoint interval
(b) Detection latency transposing the checkpoint interval
Figure 2: Possible cases of recovery using multiple system-level checkpoints,
depending on the detection latency
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Algorithm 1 Recovery algorithm with multiple system-level checkpoints
1: int extern counter=0; ⊲ an external counter that controls the number of
rollbacks (not included in checkpoint)
2: boolean fault detected= FALSE;
3: (...) ⊲ application code
4: sys ckpt(n−1); ⊲ save a system checkpoint
5: (...) ⊲ application code
6: sys ckpt(n); ⊲ save a system checkpoint
7: if fault detected == TRUE then ⊲ A fault was detected when
communicating
8: extern counter++; ⊲ now extern counter is 1, so restart from
checkpoint n will be tried
9: fault detected= FALSE ⊲ reset detection flag for restart
10: restart from sys ckpt(n); ⊲ restart from last checkpoint (Fig. 2a)
11: end if
12: (...) ⊲ application code. If the fault is not detected again, then checkpoint
n is clean and execution will finish correctly
13: if fault detected== TRUE then ⊲ A fault was detected when
communicating ⊲ checkpoint n is dirty since the fault was detected again
14: extern counter++; ⊲ now, extern counter is 2 so, restart from
checkpoint n−1 will be tried
15: fault detected= FALSE; ⊲ reset detection flag for restart
16: delete sys ckpt(n); ⊲ delete the dirty checkpoint
17: restart from sys ckpt(n−1); ⊲ restart from last but one checkpoint
(Fig 2b)
18: end if
extra checkpoints that need to be reversed if the restart from the last one does
not succeed. The third term represents the time spent in checkpointing, taking
into account that various checkpoints might be recorded again if corruption is
found that prevents successful recovery. The fourth term is an estimate of the
re-execution time, considering that, on average, the fault may be detected at
the middle of the checkpoint interval. This lapse will need to be re-executed
in the best case, i.e. when recovery is possible from the last stored checkpoint
(k = 0). If k > 0, the same portion plus a number of checkpoint intervals (which
depend on the value of k) will require to be re-executed. Eventually, the last
term represents the number of needed restarts.
TFA = Tprog(1 + fd) + Tcomp + ntcs (5)
TFP = Tprog(1 + fd) + Tcomp + (n+ k)tcs+
+(
k∑
m=0
(k −m+ 1/2))ti + (k + 1)Trest
(6)
When system-level checkpoints are the only available option, this strategy
becomes appropriate, despite having two significant limitations. The first one
refers to the amount of required storage. None of the checkpoints can be erased,
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given the uncertainty about the validity of the data recorded in them: if a con-
sistent checkpoint cannot be found, a significant part of the application will
need to be re-executed; in an extreme case, the whole execution will have to
be relaunched from the beginning [8]. In any case, the negative impact of mul-
tiple checkpoints over the storage can be reduced by means of solutions based
on multi-level checkpointing [7]. The second important drawback is related to
scalability: in upcoming exascale systems, and despite some considerable efforts
[20], coordinated-system-level checkpoints would not be the most suitable solu-
tion, because they keep a large amount of information related to the system.
In an unrefined version, our method is an expensive approach, because it needs
to keep an undetermined number of active checkpoints and may require sev-
eral restart attempts. Instead, user-level checkpoints are becoming more usual,
especially due to their lower costs and portability possibilities [1].
3.3 Recovery based on a single safe application-level
checkpoint
This third alternative included in SEDAR is designed to overcome the limita-
tions caused by the utilization of system-level checkpoints. In this context, and
despite requiring detailed knowledge of the application internal organization
(computing and communication), user-level checkpoints are a more appropriate
option, given the fact that they only save the application-related information.
Besides that, they are smaller, more portable and scale better than the system-
level versions. As a consequence, the utilization of a single user-level checkpoint
for recovery is proposed, in conjunction with a strategy to ensure the validity of
the last recorded checkpoint. Therefore, the prior checkpoints can be removed,
thus decreasing storage usage and reducing the relaunching latency.
The proposed solution records per-thread user-level checkpoints, taking ad-
vantage of the synchronization mechanism between replicas. Such checkpoints
consist of saving only the set of variables that are significant to the applica-
tion at that specific moment. As both threads checkpoints are stored, a hash
on each one is calculated. The same mechanism used for validating contents
of messages in the detection phase is applied to collate the two hashes, so the
checkpoint is considered valid only if the comparison proves true. In this sit-
uation, the previous checkpoint can be safely discarded to save storage, as the
current one constitutes a consistent state for recovery. On the other hand, if
an error is detected on re-execution, it is not possible to use the last checkpoint
for recovery, i.e. it is considered corrupted. Therefore, this checkpoint has to
be erased and the execution has to be resumed from the previous checkpoint.
As a consequence, there is a single valid checkpoint at any given time (except
for the validation interval) independently of the comparison result. Algorithm 2
describes the pseudo-code of the proposed mechanism.
In the absence of faults, the execution time of this mechanism is given by
Equation 7. The time is equal to the only-detection strategy, but incorporates an
additional term which represents the time employed for n user-level checkpoints
to be recorded and for each of them to be validated. Instead, Equation 8
accounts the time when a fault occurs. The fourth term shows that, on average,
just half of the checkpoint interval has to be re-executed, as barely a single
rollback is required, and a single restart time, shown in the last term. It is
important to notice that Tcomp represents the time required for the validation
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Algorithm 2 Recovery algorithm with application-level checkpoints
1: function usr ckpt(n) ⊲ usr ckpt function definition
2: for (tid=0; tid ¡ 2; tid++) do ⊲ for both replicas
3: store all significant variables(tid); ⊲ record its custom checkpoint
4: hash array[tid]=compute hash(tid);
5: end for
6: synch threads(); ⊲ wait for each other
7: if tid==0 then ⊲ only one of the replicas compares hashes
8: if hash array[0]==hash array[1] then ⊲ they match
9: remove all significant variables(tid); ⊲ delete own checkpoint
10: return TRUE; ⊲ this is a valid checkpoint so the previous can
be discarded
11: else
12: return FALSE ⊲ this is a corrupted checkpoint
13: end if
14: end if
15: end function
16:
17: (...) ⊲ application code
18: if usr ckpt(n)== TRUE then ⊲ n represents the current checkpoint
19: remove usr ckpt(n-1); ⊲ delete previous checkpoint since the current is
valid
20: else
21: remove usr ckpt(n); ⊲ remove current corrupted checkpoint
22: restart from usr checkpoint(n-1); ⊲ restart from previous chekcpoint
23: end if
of application results, while TcompA comprises the time required to validate an
application-level checkpoint. As user-level checkpoints tend to be smaller than
their system-level counterparts, TcompA is expected to be shorter.
TFA = Tprog(1 + fd) + Tcomp + n(tca + TcompA) (7)
TFP = Tprog(1 + fd) + Tcomp + n(tca + TcompA)+
+(1/2)ti + Trest
(8)
4 An Evaluation of the Recovery Method
4.1 Analytical Model
In order to validate the strategy for automatic recovery, we have built a model of
a demonstration case, based on a well-known test application combined with a
complete, controlled workfault. The modeled case contemplates all the possible
faults that can happen, based on the deep knowledge of the behavior of the ap-
plication. Each fault injection experiment has a predictable effect, a moment in
which it is certainly detected and a determinable point for recovery. Obviously,
there are infinite physical possibilities of fault occurrences, but all of them are
represented in the listed cases. A single fault is injected for each experiment.
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The test application is synthetic, built-up over an MPI Master/Worker ma-
trix multiplication (C = A × B). The modifications consist of replicating pro-
cesses in threads for detection, in addition to final validation of the resulting
matrix. Every time the application performs a communication, a system-level
checkpoint is done since messages are sent only if the involved data are safe. The
matrix-multiplication has been selected because it is a regular, computationally-
intensive, representative parallel application, with a well-known communication
pattern. The deep knowledge about its behavior allows the clear identification
of the moments of communication between processes and of the data involved
in each communication. As a consequence, the precise effect of each injected
fault can be predicted, as well as the state of each recorded checkpoint (clean
or dirty), and, therefore, which checkpoint makes the recovery possible.
The pseudo-code for the test application is shown on Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Pseudo-code for the test application
1: SEDAR Init()
2: SEDAR Ckpt() ⊲ Checkpoint #0 (CK0)
3: SEDAR Scatter(A) ⊲ Master scatters matrix A (SCATTER)
4: SEDAR Ckpt() ⊲ Checkpoint #1 (CK1)
5: SEDAR Bcast(B) ⊲ Master broadcasts matrix B (BCAST)
6: SEDAR Ckpt() ⊲ Checkpoint #2 (CK2)
7: matmul(A,B,C) ⊲ Each process computes its block (MATMUL)
8: SEDAR Gather(C) ⊲ Master gathers matrix C (GATHER)
9: SEDAR Ckpt() ⊲ Checkpoint #3 (CK3)
10: if rank == MASTER then
11: SEDAR Validate(C) ⊲ Master validates final result (VALIDATE)
12: end if
The possible cases for injection experiments are organized according to the
following criteria:
• Pinj : the execution instant where the injection is carried out, taking as
reference the structure of the application (e.g. between the SCATTER
and CK1).
• Process: if the injection is made in the code executed by the Master or
any Worker.
• Data: if the injection is made either on an element of the matrix A, B
or C, or on an index variable. Also, if the injected value is used by the
Master or a Worker for its computation (e.g. A(M), C(W), i(M), etc).
• Effect: TDC, FSC, LE or TOE.
• Pdet: the execution moment where the fault is detected. It could be at
communication or at the final validation.
• Prec: the nearest moment from which it is possible to recover.
• Nroll: the number of attempts required for correct recovery. The possible
values are: 0, if the injected fault causes a LE; 1, if recovery is possible
from the last recorded checkpoint; 2, if it is necessary to rewind to the
last but one checkpoint; and so on.
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Based on the combinations of these factors, we have designed a set of 64
injection experiments which cover all the situations that can occur in the target
test application. The 64 cases have been designed according to the following
criteria: the faults are injected both in the code executed by the Master and
by the Workers, in elements of each of the three matrices. The injections in
the Master code are made both in data that it transmits and in other that
are kept for local use. The injection in the Workers code are made in data
that will be transmitted, as the Workers do not retain results locally. In both
the Master and the Workers, there are faults injected after each checkpoint,
i.e. the checkpoint is clean, so recovery is possible. Instead, other faults are
injected after a communication operation but before the subsequent checkpoint
(i.e. between them, into already validated data), making that checkpoint dirty
and forcing more than one rollback to recover. On the other hand, the injections
in index variables are made, both in the Master and the Workers codes, during
the actual matrix-multiplication operation, in order to make the processing of
both redundant threads assimetric.
To illustrate the method followed, only a few representative cases are detailed
in Table 2. These cases were selected mainly to make evident the four possible
effects of a fault (TDC, FSC, LE or TOE), but also to display injections made
in the codes of both the Master and the Workers, showing different moments of
detection and reflecting various possible situations of recovery (i.e. no need to
rollback, rollback to the last checkpoint or multiple rollback attempts).
Case Pinj Process Data Effect Pdet Prec Nroll
2 CK0 - SCATTER Master A(W) TDC SCATTER CK0 1
29 BCAST - CK2 Worker C(W) LE - - 0
50 GATHER - CK3 Master C(M) FSC VALIDATE CK2 2
59 MATMUL Worker i(W) TOE GATHER CK2 1
Table 2: Selected representative injection cases: effects and predicted points of
detection and recovery
From Table 2 we can observe that:
• In Case 2, the injection is carried out modifying the matrix A from the
Master process between CK0 and SCATTER stages. The injected element
of A is going to be transmitted to a Worker, so this injection produces a
TDC error, which will be detected at SCATTER moment. The recovery
is possible from the last checkpoint done (CK0, a clean checkpoint).
• An example of LE error is described in Case 29. The injection happens
between BCAST and CK2 affecting matrix C from a Worker. As this
matrix has not been computed yet and will be overwritten afterward, the
error does not modify the final result.
• Case 50 shows the details for an injection experiment that causes a FSC
error. The injection is made in an element of matrix C that has been
already calculated and received by the Master (GATHER), but before
making the checkpoint CK3. The error will be detected at the VALIDATE
stage, and, because CK3 is dirty (the fault occurred before recording it),
an additional rollback is required to recover.
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• A possible TOE error is detailed in Case 59. This injection takes place at
MATMUL stage and affects an index variable used by a Worker, causing
one of the replicas to restart its computation after it has already done part
of its task. This causes a delay in the affected thread, which is detected
as a TOE; only the other replica reaches the GATHER operation within
a configurable lapse. The recovery is built from the CK2 point (a single
rollback is enough).
A conclusion of our analysis is that any random fault that can occur along
the execution resembles some of the modeled cases. A method of analysis like
the one described, based on the knowledge of the target application and the
moments of checkpointing, in combination with controlled and systematic fault
injection, allows us to predict the behavior of both the detection and the auto-
matic recovery mechanisms. Thus, the efficiency of the strategy is shown when
running in a real environment with random faults.
4.2 Results over a Real Implementation
The described set of experiments has been carried out with standard tools. The
implementation of the fault tolerance strategy consists in a library of modified
MPI functions and data types with extended functionality for fault detection.
This include buffers comparison before sending, message copies upon reception,
and synchronization between replicated threads.
The coordinated system-level checkpoints are built with DMTCP library [21],
which generates distributed-per-process checkpoint files, and a single restart
script for each checkpoint.
The fault injection is made from inside the test application. An ad-hoc
function is included in the library, that contains the 64 cases, and conditional
compilation is used to make a single injection in each experiment. Depending
on the number of the particular injection case, the function is invoked in a
different place during the execution. This function works in conjunction with
a file that is used to control if an injection has been already made (named
injected.txt). The content of this file is evaluated in each function call. At
the first time, the file contains the value 0 and when the injection is made,
its content is incremented (it is changed to 1 ). In the recovery process, the
code is re-executed calling the injection routine again. As the file content is
re-evaluated, the function returns without making a new injection since it has
changed. This flag needs to be external to the application so that its content is
independent of the checkpointing storage (i.e. when a checkpoint is made, the
value in the file is no affected).
The recovery mechanism, based on keeping a chain of checkpoints, uses
another file to control how many times the same fault has been detected (named
failures.txt). This file is initialized with 0 and its content is incremented each
time that a fault is detected. Assuming that a single error occurs during an
execution, the file contains 1 for the first detection, and rollback to last restart
script is tried. If an error is detected during re-execution, it is assumed that
it is the same error as the previous one that the checkpoint is dirty due to the
detection latency. In this case, the file’s content becomes 2 and a rollback to the
prior checkpoint is tried. Therefore, the content of the file is used to choose the
number of the restart script that has to be executed. Again, the file needs to be
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external to the application, so that its content is independent of the checkpoint
storage.
The 64 injection experiments were performed over the test application, us-
ing a cluster of Blade multicores with four blades. Each node contains two
quad core Intel Xeon e5405 2.0GHz processors. The L1 private cache is 64Kb
and shared-between-pairs-of-cores L2 cache is 6Mb. RAM memory (shared be-
tween both processors) is 10Gb and the local disk stores 250Gb. The operating
system is GNU/Linux Debian 6.0.7 (64 bits, kernel version 2.6.32). OpenMPI
(version 1.6.4) is the communication library and DMTCP (version 2.4.4) is the
checkpointing.
Figure 3 shows the output file of one of the injection experiments, namely
Injection Case 50, in order to demonstrate the followed methodology and the
obtained behavior.
Figure 3: Output of the execution of the test application when the fault of Case
50 is injected
As a detail, our implementation of fault-tolerant MPI functions is based on
point-to-point communications, which make them more general and allow us to
show up the FSC cases, at the expense of sacrificing performance. However, we
also have developed versions of collective communications, which are optimized.
It is important to note that in collective communications, the sender process
also participates in them, either sending or receiving. If our test application
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just uses collective operations, the corrupted data gets transmitted and hence it
is validated. In this way, only TDC cases remain and FSC cases should not be
any longer present. It is clear that this idea could be extended to many other
applications.
4.3 Evaluation of the Temporal Costs
In order to show how our model can be used to evaluate the temporal behavior
of each alternative, a simple example is presented, which includes real measured
overhead values taken from carried-out tests [18] for parameters in Table 1.
For the testing stage, we have used three parallel benchmarks: matrix multi-
plication; Jacobi method for Laplace’s equation; and DNA sequence alignment.
These applications have been selected because they are well-known, compu-
tationally intensive, and representative of the scientific computing. In addi-
tion, they allow to study the effects of having different communication patterns:
Master-Worker, Single-Program-Multiple-Data (SPMD) and Pipeline, respec-
tively. During the experiments, the number of processes P has been varied
between 4, 8 and 16. For each benchmark, different sizes of workload have
been used: N={2048, 4096, 8192, 16384} for matrix multiplication; N={4096,
8192, 16384} for solution to Laplaces equation and N={65536, 131072, 262144,
524288} for DNA sequence alignment.
The goal of the tests carried out was to compare execution times of the three
target applications between raw MPI versions and our MPI-based implementa-
tion of SEDAR, that includes mechanisms for duplicating processes, synchro-
nizing replicas, comparing and copying the messages’ contents and validating
the final results. The average values of parameters Tcomp and fd were obtained
by measuring the resulting overheads of adding the mentioned features. To be
clear, a maximum of four processes have been mapped in a node in the case of
the original MPI executions, which means that in each node just four cores have
been used. The same mapping was assigned in our implementation, but in this
last case, all the cores of each node have been used, as the redundant threads
run on free cores. As regards parameter tcs, an average value was obtained from
times measured with DMTCP library tools. As regards Trest, despite being in-
directly measured, the obtained values are consistent to the assumption that
the time needed to perform a checkpoint can be considered equal to the time
needed to load a checkpoint from storage [22]. The parameters X and n are
manually assigned for a typical case.
The parameter ti it is calculated as follows. As it is evident, the recovery al-
ternative based on multiple checkpoints includes the time spent by the detection
mechanism, and adds the overhead due to the checkpoint storage. Taking this
fact into account, the baseline execution time that includes checkpointing cor-
responds to the time given by Equation 3 (i.e. the runtime with fault detection,
with no fault occurrence), since it is the time that can be certainly predicted.
As a consequence, if the number of checkpoints is fixed, then the total time has
to be divided by n.
Last, the parameter tca is estimated, assuming that is more lightweight to
store an application-level checkpoint than its system-level counterpart. Conse-
quently, it is supposed that the validation time of an application-level checkpoint
(i.e. parameter TcompA) is consistent with this value.
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Table 3 contains the list of all values used for the temporal evaluation, ob-
tained as described, whereas Table 4 shows the resulting times in each case.
Parameter Value
Tprog 10 hours
Tcomp 1 hour
Trest 0.9 hours
fd 0.25
X 0.5
n 5
tcs 0.9 hours
ti 2.7 hours
tca 0.5 hours
tcompA 0.5 hours
Table 3: Values of the parameters utilized in the temporal evaluation of each
alternative strategy
Situation Execution Time [hs]
Baseline, without fault (Eq. 1) 11
Baseline, with fault (Eq. 2) 22,9
Only detection, without fault (Eq. 3) 13.5
Only detection, with fault (Eq. 4) 20.65
Multiple checkpoints, without fault (Eq. 5) 18
Multiple checkpoints, with fault (Eq. 6, k = 0) 20.25
Multiple checkpoints, with fault (Eq. 6, k = 1) 26.1
Single checkpoint, without fault (Eq. 7) 18.5
Single checkpoint, with fault (Eq. 8) 20.75
Table 4: Times of execution of all SEDAR alternative strategies, both in absence
and in presence of faults, compared with the baseline
Despite being a simple test case with real and estimated values, it can be
observed that adding a multiple-checkpoint-based recovery strategy generates
a larger overhead when compared to the only-detection strategy in absence of
faults, as expected. In the other hand, the relationship between the times of
Equations 5 and 7 is more complex, because the application-level checkpoints
are lighter, but each of them has to be validated.
However, depending on the system parameters (which can be measured or
estimated), the different alternatives may offer gains both in time and reliabil-
ity when facing the occurrence of a silent error. This fact becomes particularly
important in executions that can last many hours. Even, with this set of pa-
rameters, rolling back to the last but one system checkpoint (Equation 6, k = 1)
takes to larger execution time than the baseline case, which suggests that storing
more than a single checkpoint might not be the best option.
Given the fact that the temporal behavior is highly-dependent of the com-
munication pattern, the amount of transmitted data, and the detection latency,
the previous example cannot be taken as a general conclusion, of course. How-
ever, if the involved parameters are available, it demonstrates how the model
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can be applied for temporal evaluation; besides that, it shows the potential of
SEDAR in helping users of scientific applications to reach reliable executions.
4.4 Convenience of Saving Multiple Checkpoints for Re-
covery
As aforementioned, in a system that saves a chain of checkpoints for rollback,
the recovery is then possible after one or more attempts. However, as a con-
sequence of the overhead introduced by checkpointing, there are situations in
which the time spent in those attempts could be longer than simply stopping
upon detection and relaunching from the beginning. Because of that, it is useful
to evaluate in which cases it is convenient to save multiple checkpoints or, even
more, when checkpoint protection results beneficial.
This study is suggestive about how to use the developed model for the tempo-
ral behavior of only-detection strategy and multiple-checkpoints-based recovery
alternative. If statistics about the frequency and typical behavior of the faults
are available for a particular system that runs an application (i.e. when the
faults are more likely to appear), the strategy of protection can be properly
tuned between only detection and checkpoint for recovery.
From a quantitative point of view and for different values or parameter
X , some insights can be extracted from the evaluation of the execution times
in Equation 4 and in Equation 6. It can be shown that the fourth term in
Equation 6 is equivalent to:
(
k∑
m=0
(k −m+ 1/2))ti =
(k + 1)2
2
ti (9)
so that Equation 6 can be rewritten as:
TFP = Tprog(1 + fd) + Tcomp + (n+ k)tcs+
+
(k + 1)2
2
ti + (k + 1)Trest
(10)
To illustrate this idea, we evaluate the Equation 4 with four different values
of X : if the fault is detected near the beginning of execution (X = 25%), at the
middle (X = 50%), with advanced progress (X = 75%) and very close to the
end (X = 90%). The times obtained are compared with the ones derived from
Equation 10, taking into account the following considerations.
As discussed in Section 4.3, the baseline time to calculate the checkpoint
interval (ti) is the time from Equation 3. In such a total execution time (13.5
hs, see Table 2), X = 25% means that the fault is detected at t = 3.38 hs. At
this time, with ti = 2.7 hs, only Initial Checkpoint (CK0) and CK1 have been
stored. Therefore, recovery must be possible, either from CK1 (i.e. k = 0) or
from CK0 (i.e. k = 1), so both values are admissible in Equation 10.
Table 5 summarizes this data. Based on the value of parameter X , the
second column shows the times obtained with only detection, safe-stop and
relaunching from the start (i.e. from Equation 4), the third column shows the
times obtained by rewinding to the last checkpoint (i.e. from Equation 10 with
k = 0), the fourth column shows the times obtained by rewinding to the last
but one checkpoint (i.e. from Equation 10 with k = 1), and so on. The value
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NA means that the current value of k is not admissible in Equation 10 for the
current value of X , because the corresponding checkpoint has not been stored
yet by that moment of the progress of the execution.
X [%] Only detection [hs]
k+1 Rollback attempts [hs]
k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4
0.25 17.53
20.25 26.1
NA (Not Admissible)
0.5 20.65
34.65
NA
0.75 23.78
45.9
NA
0.9 25.65 59.85
Table 5: Execution time with the fault detected at X , with only detection and
with different number of rollback attempts (k+1)
The obtained results suggest that, if the fault is detected near the starting
point, it is convenient to stop, notify about the error and relaunch from the
beginning. On the other hand, if the fault is detected about the middle of exe-
cution, it is beneficial to restart from last checkpoint (CK1) when it is possible.
But if this is not the case, returning to the initial checkpoint (CK0) becomes
more expensive. This trend also holds as the application progresses: if the fault
is detected close to the end, rolling back to the last recorded checkpoint rep-
resents a noticeable improvement compared to stop and relaunch. However, if
recovery from this last checkpoint is not an option, trying from the previous
ones is still more expensive than simply halting and getting started again. This
could be caused by the large overheads involved in not only re-executing the
same computation several times, but also re-storing checkpoints and making
various restart attempts. Once again, this cannot be taken as a general conclu-
sion but contributes to the idea that, despite guaranteeing automatic recovery
in all cases, having multiple checkpoints stored is a costly method.
Following this line of analysis, and maintaining the same set of parameters,
if we force the time of Equation 4 to be minor or equal to the one of Equation 10
with k = 0, we obtainX ≤ 46.8%. This means that, below that level of progress,
it is not convenient to record any checkpoint; it is less expensive to simply stop
and relaunch. On the other hand, if we force the time of Equation 4 to be greater
or equal to the one of Equation 10 with k = 1, we obtain X ≥ 93.6%, which
means that only when that percentage of execution time has elapsed, rolling
back to the last but one checkpoint is preferable than stopping and relaunching.
It is to be noted that saving more system-level checkpoints (increasing n)
affects the total time negatively; the large overhead produced by checkpointing
exceeds the supposed advantage of rolling back a shorter time interval.
Although these are simple examples, they are illustrative about how useful
conclusions can be drawn from the model of temporal behavior, which allow to
adapt the protection strategy based on the knowledge of the parameters of the
system.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Exascale computing presents several challenges to future generation computer
systems and guaranteeing reliability is one of them. The protection of the MPI
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applications at the message level is a feasible and effective method for detecting,
secluding and avoiding the propagation of data corruption, taking into account
the deep effects that a single transient fault can cause on all processes that
communicate. In this article, SEDAR is presented, which is a methodology for
detecting and recovering from silent errors. SEDAR consists in three comple-
mentary alternatives for only-detection, recovery based on multiple system-level
checkpoints and recovery based on a single user-level checkpoint. As the most
remarkable conclusions, they can be mentioned:
• The functional behavior in the presence of faults is described by means of
an analytical model, built on a well-known test case, showing the validity
of the detection and the recovery mechanisms.
• The predictions of the model are empirically verified by controlled fault-
injection experiments, which allow to demonstrate the reliability provided
by SEDAR strategies.
• An approach to a temporal characterization is presented for the three
alternative strategies. As each of them supplies a particular coverage but
also has limitations and implementation costs, the possibility of choosing
between them allows adjusting to the needs of a particular system. Hence,
SEDAR can be flexibly adapted to meet a determined cost-performance
trade off.
• The cases in which it is useful to store multiple checkpoints for automatic
recovery are discussed, as well as the convenient moment to start protec-
tion; this illustrates how to use the model of temporal behavior to extract
guidelines about when it is beneficial to employ each SEDAR protection
strategy.
• As a conclusion, the viability and efficacy to tolerate transient faults in
expected HPC exascale systems is shown.
As ongoing and future lines of work, we can enumerate:
• Implementation of the emulation of non-deterministic calls, that is re-
quired to extend the scope of applications that can be protected with
SEDAR.
• Experimental validation using applications with customized, non-coordinated
user-level checkpoints, and calculation of the optimal checkpoint interval
to minimize execution overhead.
• Implementation of automatic adaptation of the recovery strategy, i.e. di-
namically start protection by checkpointing depending on the progress of
the execution, based on the reasoning stated in section 4.4.
As a final aim, the integration with scalable architectures that use C/R
for permanent fault tolerance [23] should be tried. As SEDAR also provides
scalable options for detection and recovery, fault-tolerance for both types of
errors could be achieved for projected exascale systems. It is important to
clarify that a production version of SEDAR is being developed, whereas the
current implementation remains as a prototype.
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